§ 01 · HIPAA
Privacy, Security, & Breach Notification. Implemented end-to-end.Self-attested
45 CFR §§ 160.103, 164.302–318 (Security), 164.500–534 (Privacy), 164.400–414 (Breach Notification). Conceptual Healthcare Corporation acts as both covered entity (clinical surfaces) and business associate (DataVault, AI inference, audit chain).
Administrative safeguards · 164.308
§164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) Information system activity review. Every PHI access, authentication event, prescription action, and token transaction is logged in
app/services/audit_logger.py with HMAC-SHA256 chained signatures. The chain is verifiable independently — see
CH-IP-038.
§164.308(a)(3) Workforce security · authorization. Role-based access enforced by app/permissions/permission_engine.py. Roles in orb-ios:CEOIdentityManager persist to Keychain for reinstall recovery.
§164.308(a)(5) Security awareness · training. Onboarding curriculum at /var/www/ch-v2/ui_kits/university/ with completion tracking in guardian_user_training table.
§164.308(b) Business associate contracts. Every BAA is hashed (SHA-256) and bound into the operator's mTLS certificate as an X.509 OID extension per
CH-IP-043. The orchestrator daemon (CH-IP-046) refuses any tier1 (PHI) software update whose signing operator does not carry a valid BAA hash.
Physical safeguards · 164.310
§164.310(a)(1) Facility access. Conceptual Healthcare Corp HQ in Destin, FL operates the primary chain validator (ch-validator-1) under physical access controls; the chain auditing key never leaves the facility. Production deployments use cloud-native compute over CH VPN.
§164.310(d)(2)(i) Disposal of PHI. AES-256-GCM encryption keys are destroyed on patient delete via app/services/encryption_manager.py:destroy_key; data at rest is rendered cryptographically unrecoverable.
Technical safeguards · 164.312
§164.312(a)(1) Access control · unique user. Every request authenticates via JWT (app/auth/jwt_handler.py) bound to chMemberId. No service-account login to PHI surfaces.
§164.312(a)(2)(i) Automatic logoff. 5-minute idle timeout enforced in orb-ios:SessionManager; same on web via _shared/ch-page.js.
§164.312(a)(2)(iv) Encryption at rest. AES-256-GCM via app/services/message_encryption.py. All PHI fields encrypted before persistence.
§164.312(b) Audit controls. HMAC-chained audit log; tamper detectable by re-deriving each entry's signature from the previous. Chain entries posted to
chain.conceptualhealth.com.
§164.312(c)(1) Integrity. Every PHI write is signed; every read verifies the signature. Implementation: chagent/edge.py:close_task + chagent/orchestrator.py:_emit_chain_audit_event.
§164.312(d) Person/entity authentication. Biometric + PIN MFA on iOS; Ed25519 keypair on every edge node and every operator.
§164.312(e)(1) Transmission security. TLS 1.3 with X25519 key agreement. Internal-network traffic over CH VPN (Noise IK + ChaCha20-Poly1305). FIPS build swaps to AES-256-GCM with byte-identical wire format — see
CH-IP-044.
Breach Notification · 164.400-414
§164.404 Patient notice. Notification within 60 days of discovery via in-app push, secure-message, and registered mail for the affected cohort. The transparency report at
trust/transparency-report.html publishes every notifiable breach with detection timestamp, OCR disclosure timestamp, root cause, and remediation. Today the count is zero.
§164.408 HHS Secretary notice. Single-incident: within 60 days. Annual summary by Mar 1 for incidents affecting <500 individuals.
Verify
# Inspect the HMAC-chained audit log directly
sudo -u postgres psql -d guardianorb -c \
"SELECT id, action, encode(prev_hash, 'hex'), encode(this_hash, 'hex')
FROM audit_log ORDER BY id DESC LIMIT 5"
# Verify every chain entry's signature link
python3 -m chagent.audit_verify --since 24h